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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2007). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing appellant's case with 
prejudice due to appellant's failure to prosecute his case for over six years. 
Standard of Review: When a party fails to prosecute its case and the trial court 
dismisses the case with prejudice, the trial court's decision is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Country Meadows Convalescent Center v. Utah Dept. of Health, Div. of 
Health Care Financing, 851 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Utah App. Ct. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute 
or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, a defendant may move 
for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him . . . . Unless the court in 
its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and 
any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates 
as an adjudication upon the merits. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(7). 
(a)(7) A Statement of the Case. The Statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
rule. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L I 
This case involves a plaintiff, Bill Parker, who failed to take the requisite steps 
to prosecute his lawsuit in the six-and-a-half year period subsequent to the events that 
gave rise to his claim. I lie issue presented by this case is v. neiik i . n -.ml JIHIMAI 
) • - o • ' -r\ .*-i<r N-Kt* ' - - • • jsecute. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts 
Mr. Parker alleges he was injured on September 23, 2000 when a Diamond 
Rental event tent collapsed and fen wn hi in. u\ . a» au^ I;I. . - •> u -u -
before the slalnii1 1 linni iiion^ *<»»'«"» negligence claim would have expired, Mr. Parker 
filed a complaint against Diamond Rental, asserting that Diamond Rental's negligence 
was the cause of his injuries. (R. at 20.) 
Ni; .- arker taiK-.. .i* hei\c a _~ •;.*—. -
 ; ,o?u- -tv- ,i,!- "• 
day pei iod reqi lired b> Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b). In fact, in the subsequent 20 
months, Mr. Parker did nothing to advance his lawsuit. Accordingly, on April 25, 
2006, the trial court dismissed his case without prejudice for failure to senc -.i-c 
complain! , ,'ilh Hie lime pioseribcd by Rule 4(b) (I ! nl ,' I ) 
On September 29, 2006, five months after this case was first dismissed and six 
years after he allegedly sustained his injuries, Mr. Parker re-filed his complaint. (R. at 
1.) Again, Mr. Parker failed to serve Diamond Kemai w iinm i J." u;i\s. Acci'mmgly, 
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his case was dismissed for the second time. (R. at 6.) Mr. Parker, in an ex parte 
motion, requested an additional 45 days to serve his complaint. (R. at 7.) The trial 
court gave him an additional 30 days, and finally, on March 7, 2007, six-and-a-half 
years after the events giving rise to his lawsuit occurred, Mr. Parker served a summons 
and a copy of his complaint on Diamond Rental. (R. at 14.) 
Diamond Rental promptly moved to dismiss Mr. Parker's complaint with 
prejudice based on his failure to prosecute his lawsuit in the six-and-a-half years since 
he was allegedly injured. (R. at 25.) In response, Mr. Parker offered no facts to justify 
or explain his failure to serve his complaint and advance his claims during that lengthy 
period. (R. at 28-30.) 
On August 16, 2007, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision granting 
Diamond Rental's motion to dismiss. (R. at 61-63.) The court found that in the six-
and-a-half years since Mr. Parker was allegedly injured, he had done "nothing other 
than file a complaint and twice fail to serve the complaint on the Defendant within the 
prescribed 120-day time period." (R. at 62.) The court also found that Mr. Parker 
failed to offer any reasonable excuse for his lack of diligence. (R. at 63.) The court 
concluded that Mr. Parker had not "put forth even the slightest effort to fulfill its 
responsibilities as a litigant." (Id.) Pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the court dismissed Mr. Parker's case with prejudice based on his failure to 
prosecute. (Id.) 
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Now, nearly seven-and-a-half years after the events giving rise to his lawsuit 
occurred, Mr. Parker appeals the trial court's decision to dismiss his case with 
prejudice. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Mr. Parker's case with 
prejudice. Litigants have an obligation to prosecute their claims diligently or have their 
claims dismissed. For six-and-a-half years, appellant failed to fulfill this obligation. 
Accordingly, Diamond Rental moved for dismissal. In response, Mr. Parker had the 
burden of establishing to the trial court that he was diligently prosecuting his action. 
When faced with Diamond Rental's motion asking the court to dismiss Mr. Parker's 
case with prejudice, Mr. Parker failed to offer any excuse for his lack of diligence. The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Mr. Parker's case. Mr. Parker 
failed to meet his burden to offer a reasonable excuse for his lack of diligence. 
To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion in dismissing for failure 
to prosecute, the appellate court refers to the same five factors that the trial court 
applies in deciding whether dismissal was appropriate in the first place. These factors 
are: (1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each party has had to move the 
case forward; (3) what each party has done to move the case forward; (4) the amount of 
difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to the other side; and (5) whether 
injustice may result from the dismissal (the "Westinghouse Factors"). Westinghouse 
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Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). 
Although these factors provide guidance, the totality of the circumstances should be 
considered in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing a 
case. Id. 
Here, application of these factors to the record demonstrates that the trial court's 
dismissal of Mr. Parker's case for failure to prosecute should be affirmed. The only 
party who had a reasonable opportunity or obligation to move the case forward was Mr. 
Parker. Yet, in six-and-a-half years, Mr. Parker failed to take any affirmative steps 
towards prosecuting his case. Mr. Parker's failure to serve a complaint during this time 
led the trial court to dismiss his case twice. Only after the second dismissal did Mr. 
Parker take an interest in his case. Diamond Rental had no obligation to take any action 
until it was formally served. Mr. Parker, on the other hand, had every opportunity and 
obligation to prosecute his case. He simply failed to do so until March of 2007, six-
and-a-half years after he was allegedly injured. Mr. Parker's failure to prosecute his 
case prejudices Diamond Rental as his lack of diligence assures that the memories of 
any witnesses will be significantly impaired by the passage of time. Moreover, 
injustice will not result from the dismissal of Mr. Parker's case. As the trial court 
noted, "it was completely within [Mr. Parker's] control to act, and he chose not to do 
so." (R. at 63.) For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
dismissing Mr. Parker's case with prejudice. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FIRST ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DISMISSING MR. PARKER'S CASE WITH PREJUDICE J 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides that "[f]or failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules . . . a defendant may move for dismissal of an 
action " Courts interpreting Rule 41(b) have found that this rule requires plaintiffs 
"to prosecute their claims with due diligence, or accept the penalty of dismissal." 
Country Meadows Convalescent Center v. Utah Dept. of Health, Div. of Health Care 
Financing, 851 P.2d 1212,1215 (Utah App. Ct. 1993) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). Indeed, a party's nonaction "is inexcusable, not only from the standpoint of 
the parties, but also because it constitutes abuse of the judicial process." Id. 
Applying these principles, Utah courts have repeatedly dismissed a plaintiffs 
case with prejudice when the plaintiff fails to prosecute with diligence. Thompson 
Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 508 P.2d 528 (Utah 1973) (trial court dismissed case for failure to 
1
 As an initial matter, Mr. Parker failed to comply with Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(7). Rule 24(a)(7) states that the appellant's brief shall include a 
"statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review . . . [and] all 
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by 
citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e)." Rule 24(e) states that 
references to the record shall be made to the pages of the "original record as paginated 
pursuant to Rule 11(b). . ." Mr. Parker's brief contains no citations to the record in 
support of his facts. Based on Mr. Parker's failure to comply with Rule 24 alone, this 
Court should disregard Mr. Parker's brief and affirm the trial court's order of dismissal 
with prejudice. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 -
1185 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612,612 (Utah 1987); Fackrellv. 
Fackrell 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987); Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(k) 
(the appellate court can disregard or strike a brief that does not comply with Rule 24). 
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prosecute based on plaintiffs failure to take affirmative steps to pursue its action over a 
7 year period); Country Meadows, 851 P.2d 1212 (trial court dismissed case after 
plaintiff did nothing in a five-year period apart from file a complaint); Maxfield v. 
Rushton, 779 P.2d 237,240 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Charlie Brown Const. Co., Inc. v. 
Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368,1371 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In each of these cases, 
the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. 
Indeed, a trial court's decision to dismiss a case "for failure to prosecute is a 
decision within the broad discretion of the trial court" and an appellate court "will not 
interfere with that decision unless it clearly appears that the court has abused its 
discretion and that there is a likelihood an injustice has been wrought." Country 
Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1214. 
Importantly, the burden is on the party "attacking a dismissal for failure to 
prosecute [to] offer a reasonable excuse for its lack of diligence." Country 
Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1215 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Both in 
response to Diamond Rental's motion to dismiss and in his opening brief, however, Mr. 
Parker fails to offer any facts that would excuse or justify his lack of diligence. In 
short, Mr. Parker offers no explanation for why it took him nearly 3 years to serve a 
complaint he originally filed in September of 2004. Mr. Parker's failure to provide any 
excuse for his lack of diligence is fatal. It was his burden to explain to the trial court 
why he failed to prosecute his action. Mr. Parker offered no facts to excuse his lack of 
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diligence. The trial court, therefore, was well within its discretion when it found that 
Mr. Parker had not "put forth even the slightest effort to fulfill [his] responsibilities as a 
litigant." (R. at 63.) 
The Westinghouse Factors outlined above all weigh in favor of affirming the 
trial court's dismissal of Mr. Parker's claim with prejudice. First, Mr. Parker was the 
only party who had an opportunity to move the case forward. He failed for six-and-a-
half years to even initiate his action, let alone prosecute it. Having never been served 
until nearly three years after the complaint was originally filed, Diamond Rental had no 
opportunity to move the case forward. Second, Mr. Parker's failure to prosecute his 
case prejudices Diamond Rental. Mr. Parker's failure to prosecute has put Diamond 
Rental in the unfair position of having to defend against Mr. Parker's rendition of 
events that occurred years ago. Mr. Parker's lack of diligence virtually assures that the 
memories of any witnesses will be significantly impaired. Third, the trial court served 
the interests of justice by dismissing Mr. Parker's case. Permitting Mr. Parker to string 
along his action for several years, repeatedly wasting the court's resources and ensuring 
by his delay that Diamond Rental's ability to mount a defense will be hindered by the 
passage of time certainly offends justice. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in dismissing Mr. Parker's case, and this Court should affirm the trial court's 
order of dismissal. 
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1. Mr. Parker Has Failed to Offer Any Excuse for His Lack of 
Diligence. 
The burden is on the party "attacking a dismissal for failure to prosecute [to] 
offer a reasonable excuse for its lack of diligence/' Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at 
1215 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Both in response to Diamond Rental's 
motion to dismiss and in his opening brief, however, Mr. Parker failed to offer any 
facts that would excuse or justify his lack of diligence. 2 
Instead, Mr. Parker attempts to justify his lack of diligence by arguing that he 
relied upon Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-40 (the "savings statute"). Because the 
savings statute allowed him to refile his complaint after it was initially dismissed, Mr. 
Parker argues that his failure to prosecute his action is excused. Mr. Parker correctly 
states that Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-40 allows a plaintiff to refile a new action 
within one year of the time a prior action fails other than on the merits. Hebertson v. 
Bank One, Utah, N.A., 995 P.2d 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). However, this statute has no 
relevance to the trial court's ability to dismiss an action based on a party's 
unwillingness to prosecute it. The savings statute merely provides that Mr. Parker's 
cause of action was not barred by the statute of limitations. The savings statute is not a 
cure-all for disinterested litigants who fail to prosecute their cases. Mr. Parker's 
2
 Mr. Parker asserts that at some point, he sent a demand letter to Diamond Rental. Mr. 
Parker's reference to this alleged fact is improper. This alleged fact was not presented 
to the trial court as a justification for his lack of diligence, and does not appear 
anywhere in the record. Mr. Parker's reference to alleged facts not included in the 
record is improper and should not be considered. 
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argument that his failure to prosecute this action is somehow justified by the savings 
statute misses the mark. Put simply, Mr. Parker cannot rely on the savings statute as 
justification for failing to do anything to move his case forward. 
Next, Mr. Parker tries to blame Diamond Rental for his own lack of diligence. 
Specifically, Mr. Parker argues that Diamond Rental "had the opportunity to inquire 
and check as to whether it had been sued . . . [Diamond Rental] did not need to merely 
wait and make plaintiff go to the trouble of serving" its complaint. (See Appellant's 
Brief at p. 8.) However, Diamond Rental had no obligation to take affirmative steps to 
determine if it has been sued in any of the various jurisdictions in which it conducts 
business. Rather, the rules of civil procedure and due process require that Mr. Parker 
"go to the trouble" of serving his complaint. For six-and-a-half years, Mr. Parker never 
bothered to serve his complaint. His argument that Diamond Rental should have 
voluntarily appeared without ever having been served is entirely unsupported. 
It was Mr. Parker's burden to offer some excuse to the trial court for his lack of 
diligence. He failed to do so. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
dismissed Mr. Parker's case because he offered no facts to the trial court -nor has he 
offered any facts to this court - to justify his lack of diligence. 
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2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding that Mr. 
Parker's Lack of Diligence was Unjustified. 
Notwithstanding Mr. Parker's failure to offer an excuse for his lack of diligence, 
an application of the Westinghouse Factors to the facts demonstrates that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion. 
a. Plaintiff Has Done Nothing to Move His Case Forward. 
The first three Westinghouse Factors all relate to the conduct of the parties, and 
ask whether each party had an opportunity to move the case forward but failed to do so. 
Here, Mr. Parker is the only party who had an obligation or reasonable opportunity to 
move this case forward. Diamond Rental was finally served in March of 2006. Until 
then, Diamond Rental was not a party and had no duty or obligation to pursue litigation 
against it that had not even been commenced by Mr. Parker. 
Rather than prosecute his case, however, Mr. Parker did nothing. Appellant 
waited almost four years from the time he was allegedly injured to file his complaint 
the first time. Having barely filed his complaint before the statute of limitations 
expired, Mr. Parker did nothing further. Indeed, in the next 20 months he failed to 
serve that complaint. Accordingly, his complaint was dismissed without prejudice. 
Five months later, Mr. Parker filed his complaint again. This was six years after the 
date Mr. Parker was allegedly injured, and two years after he filed his first complaint. 
After already having his case dismissed once for failing to serve his complaint within 
the required 120 day period, Mr. Parker again failed to serve his complaint within 120 
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days. Only after the trial court again ordered that his case be dismissed, did Mr. Parker 
finally take an interest in his case and ask the court for an additional 45 to serve his 
complaint. As the trial court noted, this history demonstrates Mr. Parker's failure to 
"put forth even the slightest effort to fulfill its responsibilities as a litigant." (R. at 63.) 
In short, Mr. Parker was the only party who had an obligation to move this case 
forward and he utterly failed to do so. Accordingly, the first three Westinghouse 
Factors support the trial court's decision to dismiss Mr. Parker's case with prejudice. 
b. Mr. Parker's Failure to Prosecute Prejudices DiamondRental. 
The fourth Westinghouse Factor is the difficulty or prejudice to Diamond 
Rental. Nearly seven-and-a-half years have now passed since the events underlying Mr. 
Parker's lawsuit occurred. Mr. Parker's failure to prosecute has put Diamond Rental 
in the unfair position of having to defend against Mr. Parker's rendition of events that 
occurred over seven years ago. Mr. Parker's lack of diligence virtually assures that the 
memories of any likely defense witnesses will be significantly diminished - to the 
extent witnesses besides Mr. Parker are even available. The trial court recognized this 
fact and stated that the "Court need not stretch its imagination to conclude that because 
of the lapse of time since the accident occurred in September 2000, the memory of 
witnesses may have been impaired, if not their outright availability to testify." (R. at 
63.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Mr. Parker's six-
and-a-half year failure to act would prejudice Diamond Rental's ability to defend 
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against his account of the underlying events. Accordingly, the fourth Westinghouse 
Factor supports the trial court's decision to dismiss Mr. Parker's case with prejudice. 
c. Injustice will not Result from the Dismissal of Mr. Parker fs 
Case. 
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in finding that the interests of 
justice would not be harmed by the dismissal, the fifth Westinghouse Factor. Mr. 
Parker's argument that dismissal results in injustice fails. Mr. Parker has hardly 
invested any of his time or resources into his case for the previous seven years. If Mr. 
Parker was concerned about recovering his damages, it would be reasonable to expect 
that he would have invested some effort into prosecuting his case. He did not, and his 
own disinterest in his lawsuit demonstrates that dismissal does not work an injustice 
against Mr. Parker. 
To the contrary, the interests of justice are served by the trial court's dismissal. 
Diamond Rental should not be held hostage by a litigant who fails to comply with his 
obligation to prosecute his action. The interests of justice are not served by allowing 
Mr. Parker to string along his action for several years, wasting the court's resources and 
ensuring by his delay that Diamond Rental's ability to mount a defense will be hindered 
by the passage of time. As the trial court correctly concluded, "[i]t was completely 
within [Mr. Parker's] control to act, and he chose not to do so." (R. at 63.) 
Accordingly, the last Westinghouse Factor weighs in favor of affirming the trial court's 
order of dismissal. 
8614627 1 1 3 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Parker has failed to exercise any diligence in the prosecution of his lawsuit. 
For six-and-a-half years after the events giving rise to this litigation occurred, Mr. 
Parker did nothing other than twice file a complaint and twice have that complaint 
dismissed due to his inaction. Mr. Parker had an obligation to diligently initiate and 
prosecute his case, and he utterly failed to meet his responsibility. The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion by dismissing Mr. Parker's case with prejudice. This Court 
should affirm the trial court's decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of March, 2008. 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
Kamie F. Brown 
Attorney for the Respondent 
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Nathan N. Jardine 
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